Bitcoin could be exposed to quantum computing threats as experts warn the network must prepare for a post-quantum future.
Summary
- Charles Edwards warns Bitcoin’s core cryptography may not survive the rise of quantum computing and urges the community to build defenses before 2026.
- Deloitte reports that 4.5 million Bitcoin worth around $550 billion remain stored in vulnerable early addresses visible on the blockchain.
- Progress in quantum computing from 256 qubits to successful Shor’s algorithm tests is narrowing the window for Bitcoin’s security upgrade.
- Experts say Bitcoin is safe for now but agree that preparing for a post quantum world must begin long before the threat becomes real.
Bitcoin faces quantum computing risk
On Oct. 8, Charles Edwards, founder of Capriole Investments and a long-time Bitcoin advocate, warned that 25% of all Bitcoin could be vulnerable to a potential quantum attack, citing research from Deloitte.
He estimated that unless these coins are moved to quantum-resistant addresses, the network could face losses worth billions or even trillions once powerful quantum computers become operational.
Edwards, known for his data-driven market research, has long described Bitcoin (BTC) as a long-term store of value. He argued that the threat of quantum computing is closer than many believe and urged the community to act before 2026 to develop a defense.
He questioned whether some investors downplay the urgency to maintain optimism, warning that “if we are one minute too late on quantum, Bitcoin goes to zero.”
The discussion he reignited touches the core of Bitcoin’s design. The network relies on the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm, or ECDSA, a cryptographic system that secures ownership and transactions.
Each Bitcoin wallet contains two keys: a public key that serves as an address for receiving funds and a private key that verifies ownership. Transactions depend on digital signatures derived from these keys.
Under ordinary computing power, reversing the link between a public and private key is practically impossible. Even the fastest supercomputers would need longer than the age of the universe to guess one private key.
Quantum computing changes this dynamic. Using qubits instead of bits, quantum systems can process many possibilities simultaneously, making them exponentially faster for certain mathematical tasks.
A process known as Shor’s algorithm could, in theory, extract private keys from public keys, something classical computers cannot achieve.
For now, researchers agree that Bitcoin’s encryption remains secure. Quantum computers capable of breaking ECDSA are still theoretical and may be a decade or two away.
However, the race toward post-quantum cryptography has already begun. Developers are experimenting with new algorithms built on lattice and hash functions that could eventually replace current systems through future network upgrades.
Risk lingers in Bitcoin’s past
Deloitte’s research into Bitcoin’s quantum vulnerability traces the issue back to the network’s earliest days. In 2009, Bitcoin transactions followed a simple format known as “pay to public key,” or P2PK.
In this system, the public key itself acted as the address. Anyone examining the blockchain could see these public keys directly, including those linked to the earliest mined coins. Some of these belong to Satoshi Nakamoto and have remained untouched since Bitcoin’s creation.
While this design made early transactions easy to process, it also left a structural weakness. Because the public key is visible, a future quantum computer capable of running Shor’s algorithm could theoretically reverse-engineer the private key and spend the coins in those addresses.
In 2010, Bitcoin’s developers introduced a new system called “pay to public key hash,” or P2PKH. Instead of displaying the public key, this version shows a cryptographic hash of it.
A hash functions like a one-way lock, making it impossible to recover the original key from the address. The public key becomes visible only when the owner spends coins from that address.
This upgrade solved two issues at once. It simplified the address format and added a layer of protection by keeping the public key hidden until it was used.
However, this security came with one rule: once a P2PKH address is used, it should not be reused. Reusing an address after a transaction exposes the public key again, creating a potential entry point for future quantum attacks.
Deloitte examined the entire Bitcoin blockchain to estimate how much of the supply remains stored in vulnerable addresses. It classified all coins kept in visible or reused addresses as quantum-exposed.
The study found that about 2 million BTC are still held in original P2PK addresses, most of them early mined coins that have never been moved.
Another 2.5 million BTC are stored in reused P2PKH addresses, where the public keys have already been revealed during past transactions.
Together, this amounts to roughly 4 million BTC, or about 25% of the total Bitcoin supply. At current market prices, this equals nearly $550 billion in potential exposure.
Deloitte’s research did not predict when that day might arrive, but it made it clear that the coins that have never moved and the addresses that have been reused are the most at risk.
State of quantum progress
Quantum computing has moved from theory into active experimentation. In recent years, progress in hardware precision and control systems has advanced rapidly, allowing scientists to operate on real qubits rather than relying only on simulations.
Three main approaches lead current development: superconducting circuits, trapped ions, and photonic systems. Each focuses on maintaining stable quantum states long enough to perform reliable computation.
In 2024, several major research teams reached milestones that had once seemed distant. Quantinuum’s H-series system achieved a two-qubit gate fidelity of 99.9%, meaning errors now occur less than once in a thousand operations.
Meanwhile, in April 2025 RIKEN and Fujitsu in Japan developed a 256-qubit processor and announced plans to expand to 1,000 qubits by 2026. Researchers at Harvard also improved the stability of atomic arrays by reducing atom loss across systems containing thousands of qubits.
These achievements suggest that hardware is beginning to align with theoretical models. Progress toward scalability, or the ability to grow from hundreds to thousands of qubits without collapse, is now becoming central to research.
Until recently, most quantum experiments demonstrated isolated proofs of concept. The latest generation of machines can now maintain multi-step calculations, a key requirement for running complex algorithms such as Shor’s.
Even with these gains, the distance between current machines and one capable of breaking Bitcoin remains vast. To compromise elliptic curve cryptography, a computer would need about one million logical qubits.
A logical qubit is not a single element but a cluster of many physical qubits that correct one another’s errors. Creating one reliable logical qubit can require thousands of unstable physical ones.
Today’s largest quantum processors remain below one thousand physical qubits, keeping practical decryption far beyond reach.
Preparing for the post-quantum era
The progress in quantum research has also revived discussion about its implications for Bitcoin. The network’s security depends on elliptic curve digital signatures, which could be vulnerable once quantum systems reach sufficient computational power.
On Sep. 2, that theoretical risk moved closer to reality. Steve Tippeconnic, a researcher using IBM’s 133-qubit platform, used quantum interference to solve a small elliptic curve problem.
The key he broke was only six bits long, something an ordinary computer could guess instantly. The importance of the experiment lay in what it proved.
For the first time, Shor’s algorithm was executed on real quantum hardware at a level deep enough to show practical control. The system completed hundreds of thousands of sequential operations without collapsing into random noise, a level of stability that was impossible just a few years ago.
A 2024 study titled Downtime Required for Bitcoin Quantum-Safety estimated that migrating Bitcoin to a quantum-safe signature scheme could take about seventy-six cumulative days of coordinated downtime across all nodes.
The researchers advised beginning this process before the first cryptographically relevant quantum computer becomes operational.
Experts remain divided on when that milestone will arrive. Some forecast the early 2030s, while others believe it may take another fifteen to twenty years.
Concern about this risk is spreading beyond the scientific community. BlackRock described quantum computing as a potential material threat in its Bitcoin ETF filings.
Solana (SOL) co-founder Anatoly Yakovenko has also said that Bitcoin’s current cryptography should be replaced by 2030 to avoid potential exposure.
None of these developments mean Bitcoin is in immediate danger. They do, however, mark a clear transition point. Each improvement in qubit stability and error correction brings the world closer to the moment when encryption standards must evolve.
In that sense, Edwards’s warning was not alarmist but forward-looking. The time to prepare is available, but it is steadily narrowing.
Source link